Review of Economic Design, 4, 35-55 (1999).
Walter Bossert (email@example.com) (Department of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK)
Marc Fleurbaey (firstname.lastname@example.org) (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, 33 Bd du Port, F-95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, France)
Dirk Van de gaer (email@example.com) (Department of Economics, NUI-University of Maynooth, Maynooth, Co. Kildare, Ireland)
This paper examines how the first-best models of compensation based on the agents' talents and responsibilities analyzed in some recent contributions can be extended to a second-best context. A few social criteria are proposed and compared to alternative approaches by Roemer and Van de gaer.
Essa leitura conduz à abordagem do No-Envy Allocation.
P.S.: Esse negócio de NO-ENVY é sério. Eu estou tomando banho de sal grosso.